

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1170

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 07340

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, NATO, GW, UK

SUBJECT: MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES

REF: LONDON 7313

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FRG/UK OFFICIAL LEVEL PAPER ON  
MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES DESCRIBED REFTEL.

2."MBFR: NUCLEAR ASPECTS. THIS PAPER IS A WORKING PAPER,  
AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE  
BRITISH AND FEDERAL GERMAN GOVERNMENTS. IT SETS OUT  
SOME OF THE MAIN ISSUES WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM THE IN-  
CLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN WASHINGTON  
ON MARCH 19TH. IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE MORE FUNDA-  
MENTAL QUESTION OF WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD OR  
SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED, A QUESTION WHICH REMAINS TO BE  
DECIDED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE; NOR DOES IT DEAL WITH THE  
VITAL PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLI-

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CATIONS.

3. THE PAPER IS BASED ON TWO ASSUMPTIONS:-

A. THAT THE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WHICH THE ALLIANCE MIGHT CONTEMPLATE WOULD BE OF THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF THOSE CONTAINED IN OPTION 3 OF THE U.S. PAPER ON 30 APRIL 1973, SUBJECT TO THE CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING AIRCRAFT SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 10 BELOW.

B. THAT THE ALLIANCE MAINTAINS ITS GROUND FORCES REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN MORE OR LESS THEIR PRESENT FORM.

3. RECIPROCITY. ONE OF THE FIRST QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IS WHETHER A NUCLEAR ELEMENT SHOULD BE USED SIMPLY AS A BARGAINING COUNTER TO SECURE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ONE OR MORE ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, OR WHETHER THERE SHOULD IN ADDITION BE SOME RECIPROCAL LIMITATION (REDUCTIONS OR FREEZES) ON THE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF RECIPROCITY ARE:-

A. WITHOUT IT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE FREE TO BUILD UP THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA WHEREAS THE AMERICANS WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO A CEILING ON THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES.

B. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING TO JUSTIFY AN MBFR AGREEMENT WHICH OBLIGED ONLY ONE SIDE TO INCLUDE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

C. A UNILATERAL OFFER OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS BY THE ALLIES WOULD BE A HIGH PRICE TO PAY IN ORDER TO SECURE A SOVIET CONVENTIONAL REDUCTION WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE JUSTIFIED IN ANY CASE.

D. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THROUGHOUT INSISTED ON THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN MBFR ON THE BASIS THAT REDUCTIONS IN SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE UNDER SECRET

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TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM LOGICAL TO REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE SUCH REDUCTIONS. THE RUSSIANS WOULD FIND THEMSELVES ON VERY WEAK PROPAGANDE GROUND IF THEY SOUGHT TO BACK OUT FROM REDUCTIONS ON THEIR SIDE.

E. UNILATERAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS BY THE WEST MIGHT SET AN UNWELCOME PRECEDENT FOR UNREQUITED CON-

CESSIONS ON NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS IN SALT.

5. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST RECIPROCITY ARE:-

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A. IT REDUCES THE VALUE OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT AS A  
MAKEWEIGHT.

B. TO DEMAND RECIPROCITY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD MIGHT  
MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST SOVIET DEMANDS FOR  
RECIPROCITY IN OTHER FIELDS, E.G. SOME FORM OF  
LIMITATION ON US TANK HOLDINGS IN RETURN FOR THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY.

C. IF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A  
COMPLETE SOVIET TANK ARMY WERE ACCEPTED IT WOULD  
IN ANY CASE RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE  
FROGS AND SCUDS WHICH ARE INTEGRAL TO THE TANK  
ARMY.

D. DEMANDS FOR RECIPROCITY MIGHT STRENGTHEN THE EASTERN ARGUMENT FOR THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS IN TURN COULD LEAD TO THE CREATION  
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OF A NUCLEAR CEILING IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE FUTURE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS.

E. WE MIGHT WISH TO EXCLUDE EQUIPMENT FROM PHASE II REDUCTIONS. IN THAT CASE WE SHOULD AVOID ARRANGEMENTS IN PHASE I WHICH COULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR THE INCLUSION OF EQUIPMENT IN PHASE II. UNILATERAL UNRECIPROCATED EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I MIGHT BE LESS PREJUDICIAL IN THIS RESPECT THAN RECIPROCAL ONES.

6. FORMS OF RECIPROCITY. IF WE INSISTED ON SOME FORM OF NUCLEAR RECIPROCITY, SHOULD THAT INVOLVE REDUCTIONS OF WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS OR SHOULD WE BE CONTENT WITH A FREEZE OR SOME OTHER KIND OF CEILING ON WARSAW PACT HOLDINGS? THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF REDUCTIONS ARE:-

A. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY EASIER TO JUSTIFY AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH INVOLVED ACTUAL REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE.

B. WE COULD NOT ENSURE THAT THE FROGS AND SCUDS INTEGRAL TO THE SOVIET TANK ARMY WERE ACTUALLY WITHDRAWN UNLESS WE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THEM.

7. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A FREEZE OR THE IMPOSITION OF SOME SORT OF CEILING ARE:-

A. IT WOULD NOT REDUCE THE VALUE OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT AS A MAKEWEIGHT TO THE SAME EXTENT AS REDUCTIONS.

B. THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR SYSTEMS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AIRCRAFT, SEE PARAGRAPH 10) IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA MAY NOT BE OF SUCH A KIND AND OF SUCH MAGNITUDE THAT WE WOULD HAVE A PRESSING MILITARY INTEREST IN SECURING THEIR REDUCTION, ESPECIALLY SINCE THAT REDUCTION WOULD IN PRACTICE AMOUNT ONLY TO THEIR WITHDRAWAL A FEW HUNDRED KILOMETRES EASTWARDS.

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C. THE WARSAW PACT HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYED  
IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA WHICH IS COMPARABLE WITH  
PERSHING AND WHICH WOULD THEREFORE BE A SUITABLE  
COUNTERPART.

8. WARHEADS. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WOULD AFFECT THE  
INCLUSION OF WARHEADS IN A NUCLEAR ELEMENT:-

A. REDUCTIONS OF WARHEADS WOULD IN PRACTICE BE UN-  
VERIFIABLE. WE DO NOT WANT TO PREJUDICE THE  
ALLIANCE'S GENERAL POSITION ON VERIFICATION.

B. SINCE WARHEAD REDUCTIONS WOULD IN PRACTICE BE  
UNVERIFIABLE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY  
RECIPROCITY. ANY AGREEMENT FOR RECIPROCAL RE-  
DUCTIONS WOULD THUS BE AN ACT OF FAITH.

C. THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO RETAIN THE FREEDOM TO  
CHANGE THE TYPE OF ITS WARHEADS.

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D. IF WARHEADS WERE INCLUDED IN MBFR IT WOULD BE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. NOT TO REDUCE ITS WARHEAD STOCKS UNILATERALLY.

E. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL REASONS WARHEAD REDUCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE SOME APPEAL FOR ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

F. FOR AKI THESE REASONS, WARHEADS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A SPECIAL CASE. IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE, THEREFORE, TO PRESENT WARHEAD REDUCTIONS SEPARATELY FROM THE NUCLEAR DELIVDUY SYSTEMS ELEMENT IN MBFR.

9. PHASING. A NUCLEAR ELEMENT COULD BE USED TO TRY AND SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE WHOLE OF THE ALLIED MBFJH PROPOSALS OR ALTERNATIVELY TO PHASE I ONLY (I.E. THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING). THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR  
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OF THE FORMER ALTERNATIVE ARE:-

A. THE ALLIANCE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS ON ANY LARGER SCALE THAN THAT ENVISAGED IN THE U.S. OPTION 3.

B. THE INCLUSION OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION BY THE ALLIANCE AND THEREFORE DESERVES A MORE SUBSTANTIAL COUNTERPART THAN SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PHASE I PROPOSALS.

C. IF THE WHOLE OF THE U.S. OPTION 3 WERE USED IN PHASE I IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESIST DEMANDS FOR FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING PERHAPS REDUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, IN PHASE II.

D. SOME NUCLEAR ELEMENT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO SECURE WARSAW PACT AGREEMENT TO THE HEAVILY ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WHICH THE ALLIANCE WILL BE SEEKING IN PHASE II, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO THE 'CONCEPT' OF THE COMMON CEILING.

10. "THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF USING THE WHOLE OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT IN PHASE I ARE:-

A. FOR THE ALLIANCE THE MOST IMPORTANT WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS ARE SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD AIM AT FURTHER SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, IT IS IN PHASE I THAT WE HOPE TO SECURE THE MAJOR PRIZE IN TERMS OF SOVIET FORCES.

B. ASSUMING THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT AFFORD A NUCLEAR ELEMENT SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN THE U.S. OPTION 3 IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE OFFER OF ONLY A PART OF U.S. OPTION 3 WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO SECURE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PHASE I PROPOSALS.

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C. THE ALLIANCE'S PHASE I PROPOSALS REQUIRE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY OF THE ACTUAL FIGURE AT WHICH THAT CEILING WOULD BE SET OR OF THE SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE REQUIRED TO EFFECT IT). THAT COULD BE REGARDED AS A MAJOR AND DECISIVE ACHIEVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE SEEN AS PART OF THE PRIZE TO BE WON BY OFFERING A NUCLEAR ELEMENT.

11. "DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. SHOULD A NUCLEAR ELEMENT INCLUDE DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT? THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEIR INCLUSION ARE:-

A. STATIONED AIRCRAFT ARE QUICKLY RETURNABLE TO THE REDUCTIONS AREA; THEIR WITHDRAWAL MIGHT THUS NOT BE VERY SERIOUS FOR THE ALLIANCE.

B. THE AMERICAN F4S ARE THE MOST ADVANCED AND SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA. AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW SOME OF THEM WOULD THUS BE A VALUABLE NEGOTIATING ASSET FOR WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO PAY.

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LIMDIS

C. WITHOUT THE F4S THE NUCLEAR PACKAGE MIGHT BE  
ENOUGH TO SECURE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE AL-  
LIANCE'S REQUIREMENTS.

12. "THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INCLUSION OF DUAL-CAPABLE  
AIRCRAFT ARE:-

A. THEIR INCLUSION MIGHT PRE-EMPT THE INCLUSION OF  
AIR FORCES GENERALLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS  
IS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE HAS NOT YET  
TAKEN A DECISION.

B. 54 F4S REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE U.S.  
DUAL-CAPABLE FORCES IN THE AREA AND OF THE AL-  
LIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR STRIKE  
AIR FORCES IN THE GUIDELINES AREA AND THEREFORE  
OF NATO'S DETERRENT.

C. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT  
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HOLDINGS OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. SINCE 647 FISHBEDS AND 336 FITTERS IN THE AREA NOW ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE ALLIANCE AS BEING POTENTIALLY DUAL-CAPABLE, THE ALLIANCE CAN NO LONGER ASSUME THAT IT HAS A SUPERIORITY IN NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN GENERAL AND OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN PARTICULAR.

D. RECIPROCITY IN DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY IN VERIFYING DUAL-CAPABILITY AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE WARSAW PACT HAS NO AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE IN PERFORMANCE TO THE F4.

E. INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT ONLY PRESENT VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION BUT WOULD ALSO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST DEMANDS FOR INCLUSION OF EUROPEAN DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN PHASE II.

13. TACTICS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO DECIDE AT WHAT POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE ALLIES MIGHT INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN MBFR. THE DETERMINING FACTOR WOULD BE THE DECISION WHETHER TO USE A NUCLEAR ELEMENT ONLY FOR PHASE I OR TO SECURE ALL THE REDUCTIONS WE NEED TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMON CEILING. IN EITHER EVENT THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS APPLY:-

A. AN INDICATION OF ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP REQUIRING APPROVAL OF THE COUNCIL.

B. WILLINGNESS BY THE ALLIANCE TO INCLUDE A NUCLEAR ELEMENT, WHETHER RECIPROCAL OR NOT, SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS DOWN TO A DEFINED COMMON CEILING (AND NOT MERELY TO THE 'CONCEPT' OF THE COMMON CEILING), INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE I."

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
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